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Welcome back. We're joined again by Professor John Mirshimer to discuss uh

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what's happening in Ukraine, Iran, and of course uh US grand strategy in an

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increasingly confusing time. So, thank you for coming back on, John. It's uh great to see you again.

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You're welcome, Glenn. I'm glad to be back. So I I initially had uh intended a

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different topic but as we see the bombing of uh Kiev last night which

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according to the mayor uh Klitschko he argued this was the worst bombing of Kiev in the entire war. It begs the

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question yeah what does this mean? And also I've seen in other parts of the country

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airfields being bombed of military airfields which again begs the question

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why why wait four and a half years to go after these airfields. Uh how are you assessing what the Russians are doing

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now? Well, if you listen to a lot of the chatter surrounding this massive attack

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last night, it's seen as a reprisal for all of these drone attacks, these

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Ukrainian drone attacks into Russia. And the argument is that the Russians are

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getting about what the

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attacks looked like, you might think that what the Russians were going to do

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is go out and [clears throat] pound the civilian population, uh launch what might be called a classic

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punishment campaign. But it seems quite clear that that's not

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the case. that the Russians went after military industrial targets uh and they did not

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purposely attack civilians. According to the Kev Independent, uh 20 Ukrainians were killed. This is

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surely regrettable, but it's not a large number and it does not represent a

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punishment campaign, a campaign designed to kill civilians. And what the Russians

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did was they launched a massive attack against, let's call them strategic

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targets. And they've done this in the past. There's not really that much new here.

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Yes, it was a massive attack, but as we know, there have been numerous occasions in the past where you've had massive

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attacks against military industrial targets. So, I don't see how this could

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possibly represent uh a response

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uh to the drone attacks by the Ukrainians against the Russian heartland. It doesn't sort of add up to

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me. Uh, I think the Russians are probably going to spin it that way for public relations purposes to convince

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their Russian leaders would want to convince the domestic audience that they're responding to these drone

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attacks. But in reality, this is just what you would expect from the Russians

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and what we've seen from the Russians in terms of bombing campaigns. So that'd be

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my basic assessment of what's going on here. Yeah. No, I I know the Yeah, the media

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reports uh point to the the larger killing of of civilians, but as as you

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said, in the past you would have like hundreds of drones and missiles and you may have one or two uh deaths. This time

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it was uh more relatively many more. But that being said, as you said, if you

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launch 500 missiles and drones, if the intention is to kill civilians, you're

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doing a very poor job. Uh so it it doesn't appear as you said this was a

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aim to well target civilians. Uh again doesn't mean that the 20 deaths isn't  
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horrible but again I think the context is important. Uh but how do you see um  
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because many assume that when a retaliation comes from Russia that it might not be restricted to Ukraine.  
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Again, the Russians keep pointing to European production facilities as legitimate targets or any logistic  
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centers. Um, but it does beg the question, how involved is NATO here actually? Because this is something  
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that's very much well often disputed. Although I'm not sure if you saw the news today, you had these two Russian  
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pranksters. They had called the the the adviser to the Estonian president and  
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essentially had him go on about how they had been offering coordinates in the attacks on St. Petersburg. This is quite  
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significant. It would indicate uh well make it very clear that uh NATO countries are involved in the attacks on  
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Russia. Indeed, Maria Sakarova said this that this is evidence of Estonian  
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participation in terrorist attacks on Russia. Um, so again, h how do you see  
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this? Because this is widely contested depending on where you get your news, but how involved do you see NATO being  
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in this attacks? Well, there's no question that uh NATO  
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is deeply involved. uh and I'll talk about that in a second. But I would note  
5:27  
if you look at the u uh the declaration that came out after the G7 meeting in  
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France, this was on June 17th when the declaration uh came out after the meetings were  
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concluded. uh the G7 countries said that  
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they were going to accelerate their support for the long range bombing  
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campaign by Ukraine into Russia. This is really quite remarkable. They said they  
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were going to accelerate it. Uh and then furthermore, they said in this statement that was issued after the G7 meeting  
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that they were going to ramp up uh the economic pressure on Russia. So if  
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anybody in the Kremlin had any doubts about what the goals of the Europeans  
6:22  
and the Americans are, uh they should have been dispelled uh as a result of  
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what happened in France at this meeting. And by the way, it seems quite clear  
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from uh what happened at this meeting that Trump was convinced that what the  
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Ukrainians are doing is really quite impressive and if anything they should  
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act more boldly. Uh this has been widely reported in the Ukrainian press uh to be  
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what Trump told Zalinski. Uh so it looks like the United States is uh getting  
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more involved these days than it has been over the past few months uh in  
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putting military pressure on Ukraine uh excuse me military pressure on Russia  
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by the Ukrainians. Now there's no question that we in the  
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west have been providing all sorts of intelligence  
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uh to the Ukrainians and uh furthermore  
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supporting them by giving them drones and helping them develop their own  
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drones. uh and I would imagine even helping them plan a number of the drone uh offensives  
7:46  
uh that have taken place. Uh and furthermore, as we well know, uh there  
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have been all sorts of instances where uh Ukrainian drones flew over the Baltic

7:59 states. Uh and the Russians have not reacted to any of that. Uh but they have  
8:06 made it clear that if any drones are launched from territory in the Baltic  
8:13 states uh they will attack those launch sites. Uh so that is I think at the  
8:21 moment uh the most likely scenario for  
8:26 where you get a situation where Russia actually attacks a European or to put it  
8:32 in more specific terms a NATO member state. Uh and I think for that reason uh  
8:38 none of the Baltic states are willing to allow uh Ukraine to actually launch  
8:44 drones from their territory. But if that happens, I believe the Russians would uh  
8:50 axiomatically respond. They would be foolish not to. Uh but let's assume that  
8:57 that's not going to happen. Uh then the question is, are the Russians  
9:02 going to retaliate at some point um against Europe given Europe's and  
9:11 America's assistance to the Ukrainians? Is it time for uh Russia to sort of  
9:20 throw down the gauntlet and actually attack targets uh in Eastern Europe? And  
9:26 this of course is the Sergey Caraganov argument that the time has come to do  
9:32 that. And what we have to do, we meaning the Russians here, is we have to attack  
9:38 with conventional weapons first. And if that doesn't get the Europeans and the  
9:43 Americans to stop helping uh with this drone war, then we have to turn to the nuclear weapons. My view on this, Glenn,  
9:51 and I'd be curious what you think, is that uh the Russians won't do that right  
9:58 away. Um and I think there are sort of two reasons uh for that. Uh one is I  
10:06 think uh they believe that they can parry those drone attacks quite well. Uh  
10:13 now that's not to say they'll be able to do that over the long term because again uh the G7 countries said they were going  
10:20 to accelerate their efforts uh to help uh Ukraine with this drone campaign. So  
10:27 it may reach the point where the Russians have no choice but to retaliate. But at this point it looks  
10:33 like the Russians are doing a reasonably good job of parrying the attacks. Uh and  
10:39 as long as that's the case, um I think the incentives for the Russians to  
10:44 attack into Europe are reduced uh significantly. Uh the other thing that I  
10:51 hang really matters here is what happens on the battlefield.  
10:56 uh if you believe this rhetoric in the west that the Russians are stymied on the battlefield and if anything they're  
11:03 losing on the battlefield and they're suffering massive casualties then you can spin out a story where uh it might  
11:11 make really good sense to pursue the caraganoff policy. Uh but the fact is  
11:16 that's not what's happening on the battlefield. The Russians are actually doing quite well. They're not winning a  
11:23 quick victory. There's no question about that. Uh this is a steamroller that's moving quite slowly. Uh but  
11:31 nevertheless, the Russians are moving toward conquering all of Donbass. Uh  
11:37 they don't have much left to conquer before they control all of that real  
11:42 estate. Uh so given that the Russians are doing quite well on the battlefield  
11:50 and given the fact that the Russians seem adept at parrying these drone  
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attacks quite effectively, not perfectly but quite effectively for the moment. I  
12:02 think the incentives for the Russians to go down the Caragonoff road are not that  
12:09 great at the moment. Uh, but who knows how this is going to play itself out in  
12:16 the months ahead. So, that's kind of how I see it. And I'd be curious to know what you think of my analysis.  
12:23 No, I think that probably sounds correct. I mean that's [clears throat] why also I've been uh a bit uh yeah  
12:30 cautious about the way or worried about the way many western leaders talk about the need to bring war to Russia or  
12:37 increase the pain on Russia because I think the main reason why Russia's been able to be restrained by not retaliating  
12:44 directly against any NATO country is exactly because the pain has been uh uh  
12:50 within the limit of being able to be absorbed and uh without you know having significant impact. So essentially being  
12:56 these pin pricks. So then they essentially say well instead of going after the puppet masters within NATO  
13:02 we'll just take and we'll destroy and defeat their proxy. And I think this has  
13:08 been the main approach by the Kremlin. the the problem which is why I'm very worried when the European  
13:15 leaders uh now seemingly the Americans as well are setting the objective of increasing the pain on Russia is that  
13:22 luxury of simply absorbing the pain goes away and then there's more pressure of going doing some direct strikes and  
13:29 risking a major war with uh with the west and um again it's speculation but  
13:36 but this is this would make sense because what else can Russia do then If if it's no longer sustainable, the the  
13:43 attacks come was assisted by the West, what are they going to do? Are they going to are they going to stop the war  
13:50 accept a ceasefire where the West begins to rearm Ukraine in preparation of another war? I mean, are they going to  
13:56 leave Ukraine and have NATO march in thereafter? You know, this is all capitulation which would be an  
14:01 existential threat. So if if there is no peace and the the the the  
14:08 western escalations aren't sustainable anymore that is they can't absorb the pain then I think they will from their  
14:14 perspective they would have to strike um yeah Germany or the Baltic states  
14:20 essentially putting the world at a you know a new Cuban missile crisis that is either we go all out in war or we or you  
14:27 guys back off and I think this is often what would be required tired of because often you see in human history we do go  
14:34 all the way to the edge and then once we face disaster that's when uh this you  
14:41 know state leaders begin to change their minds again I could be wrong but uh one  
14:47 thing I did want to ask you though when you say at the G7 they come with these comments like we have to accelerate the  
14:54 drone and missile attacks deep inside Russia. We saw NATO uh give some or  
15:00 announce some uh \$250,000 reward for strategies for you know  
15:06 targeting Russian airfields. Why why are they so open now? I mean in  
15:13 the they're less and less covert about this. Is this to normalize it attacks on  
15:18 Russia so the public won't be fearful of retaliation? Is it do they want a war?  
15:25 Is it to keep the US inside Europe by proving to the Americans there's nothing to fear? I mean, we could bomb the  
15:31 Kremlin tomorrow and the Russians would be too intimidated. I I it's just that  
15:37 the openness of the whole thing. It's very strange for me to see.  
15:42 I think Glenn uh the the Western elites and we're talking here mainly about the  
15:48 European elites have convinced themselves uh that Putin is the devil incarnate

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that Russia has uh grandiose ambitions

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and that uh we in the west are destined

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uh to fight uh a war with Russia at some

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point. Hard to say where, but for the time being, we're in an intense security

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competition with the Russians. This is why we have to keep uh Ukraine intact. It's the

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battering ram. Uh it's our principal weapon against the Russians while we're

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in the process of rearming for World War II. But you want to understand that that war is coming. It's just inevitable

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because Putin is this uh he's this congenital aggressor and he runs a

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country that has a rich history of aggression. So, we really have no choice. Now, you and I both believe this

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argument is ludicrous and I think ludicrous is an accurate word here. Uh I

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don't understand where this story comes from, but that doesn't matter. They have been telling this story for so long now

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that I think they believe it and I think that they have motivated

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this is there there s all sorts of motivated biases at play here that you

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were talking about. If you want to convince your public to support increased defense spending, this story

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fits perfectly. If you want to keep the Americans in, this story fits perfectly.

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So it's not I think like these people are saying what can we do to get the Americans in uh what can we do or to

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keep the Americans in what can we do to keep or increase public support for our

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policies and then they come up with this particular strategy. I don't think that's what's going on. I think it's

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much more unconscious. And I think it all revolves around the fact that if you

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tell yourself these stories long enough, you really come to believe them. I think

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you see this in the United States with regard to Iran. People have been talking about Iran as this incredibly

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dangerous threat for so long even though it's not a threat to the United States in any meaningful way that nevertheless

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the elites believe and most Americans believe. Uh so you know you and I have

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talked about this before. One of the downsides that we face of living in a world where facts and logic don't matter

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very much is that you end up in situations like the one that we face in

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Europe where the Europeans, [laughter] not the Russians, are talking about the

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inevitability of World War II. And the Russians are put in a position where they have come to conclude, well, if the

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Europeans think that war is inevitable and they're preparing for war against us, we have no

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choice but to prepare for that same war. And of course, once they do that, that

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provides ammunition for people in the West to say, "Oh, look at the Russians. They're the ones who are preparing for

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World War II." This is the classic security dilemma. whatever the Russians do for defensive purposes looks

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offensive to people uh in the west and vice versa. So we're in this spiral

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situation which I don't see any way out of at this point in time. I mean people like us try

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to talk sense uh in this uh discourse

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but we're small voices compared to the mainstream media. That's the problem. So

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we have this situation uh where Western elites have convinced themselves

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uh that the Russians are truly dangerous and that we're heading for a major  
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conflict down the road. Yeah, this uh well lack of logic. I keep  
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seeing it everywhere. For for one, the main argument now is that yeah, Ukraine is winning and when they show towards  
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the evidence, it's because the Russians are taking massive casualties and the  
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the the Ukrainians are recapturing territory. But when you look at the reparation of remains or well exchange  
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of dead soldiers you see often the ratio being like 1 to 20 even 1 to 40 is a  
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just huge amount of uh dead Ukrainian soldiers vis relatively low numbers of  
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Russian and it doesn't really make any sense. I mean, if there were higher casualties, you would assume that they would be reversed. And  
you can make the  
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argument that, well, it's uh if the Russians are moving forward, they're the one picking up the dead bodies, but  
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again, they're also saying that Ukraine is capturing territory. So, but it doesn't make much sense, but they get  
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away with it. And you also see that yeah, that Putin is deeply rational, yet at the same time, we feel comfortable  
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participating in strikes against Russia, knowing that he will be restrained. And you know, we know that Ukraine has to  
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join NATO because otherwise, you know, then Russia would never dare to attack it. But we're also saying that after the  
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after Ukraine, sorry, after Russia's done with Ukraine, it will attack NATO. You know, none of these things adds up.  
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And uh yeah, I even seen the German I think it was Merz or Vanderline made the  
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point that yeah, it was Vanderline that uh uh Russia cut off Germany from gas,  
21:24  
you know, when all the record is there that it was the other way around. It's just, you know, it's like saying we have  
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to continue the war to force Russia to negotiate. At the same time, it's the  
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Europeans that refuse to pick up the phone and talk to the Russians for more than four years. It's very it's um it's  
21:43  
very confusing to follow this kind of logic. That's what I meant when you said  
21:48  
the Europeans seem to believe this as well as the Americans. But  
21:54  
do is this deliberate to push a long war or do you just I'm I'm I'm just  
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wondering how much is ideological indoctrination and how much is deliberate strategy here.  
22:06  
Well, let's just talk a little bit about the casualty number uh or numbers. You  
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know, the New York Times had this piece uh on the relative balance of  
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casualties. Casualties meaning um killed in action plus wounded. And then they  
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also had numbers uh of soldiers killed on both sides. Uh and uh  
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apparently the New York Times article was based on a study that had been done by a think tank uh in Washington DC, the  
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CSIS. And uh the argument was that roughly  
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around 450 450,000 Russians had died and uh somewhere  
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between 125 and 150,000 Ukrainians had  
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died. So let's take the high-end number for the Ukrainians, which is 150,000.  
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Uh and again the Russian number uh is 450,000.  
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That's a 3:1 ratio. That means that three Russians have died for every  
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Ukrainian. This is simply unbelievable.  
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This cannot be the case. Uh I don't understand where these numbers  
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come from. Uh first of all, the main killer on the battlefield is artillery.

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And throughout most of the war, the estimates are that the Russians have had

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at least a 5:1 if not a 7:1 or 10:1 advantage in artillery.

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Uh if you look at uh these bombs, these smart bombs that are dropped from the

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air, uh the Russians have a huge inventory of smart bombs that they've

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been dropping on the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have virtually no smart bombs

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that they've been dropping on the Russians. Uh you might say to yourself,

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well, it's the Russians who have mainly been on the offensive. Well, there's two problems there. One is

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that the Ukrainians have launched a large number of offensives. Remember the

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Kursk offensive? Remember the famous June 4th, 2023 offensive, the one that

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was going to result in a blitz creek that took the Ukrainians to the Sea of Azov and cut the Russian front lines in

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half. Uh in 2022, the first year of the war, the Russians uh uh suffered two

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defeats because the Ukrainians launched major offensives uh in Heran and Harkke.

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Uh and then we hear about all these Ukrainian counterattacks. Uh these days,

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those are offensive operations. Uh so the Ukrainians have been on the

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offensive for a good part of the war and therefore you can't make the argument that they've been on the defensive and

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because the defense suffers less casualties than the offense does in almost all cases. Uh we should not be

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surprised by that number that the New York Times uses. So you can't you can't

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justify those numbers that way. Uh it

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just makes no sense at all. Uh and I think if anything that we're going to

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find out that the Ukrainians lost probably around or have lost probably

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and here when I say lost I mean killed in action around a million men. I think

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the argument that they've lost 150,000 is ludicrous. It just makes no sense at

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all. And nevertheless, this is reported as fact. And it is a set of facts. This

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what I'm describing is a set of facts that all sorts of people use to assess

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what the situation is between Russia and Ukraine and what we should do moving

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forward. And if you believe these numbers, which again I think are ridiculous,

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uh, you can justify upping the ante uh, and trying to help Ukraine really

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clobber the Russians and knock the Russians off as a great power, finish them off as a great power. Uh, and lots

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of people talk that way. And you just sort of say to yourself, are they making all of this up? Are they making these

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numbers up? Do you think the New York Times is making these numbers up? I don't think they're making them up. I

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think they really believed them. Uh again, there may be all sorts of motivated biases at play here that we

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that they are not uh aware of. But putting that aside, the fact is the

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elites have told themselves a story that they believe and they continue to march

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forward based on these false narratives. It's just I I don't understand the

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political debates anymore in the west because well building on what you said if you go for example back to the 2023

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counter offensive of the Ukrainians it was evident from well pretty much the first day that this was going to end in

27:31 disaster and uh and you know cuz the Russians had pulled back that from Keron  
27:37 and Karov they had to tighten up the defensive lines and it it looked as if the Ukraine is going to run into a brick  
27:44 wall. But I noticed as soon as we made the well, at least I made the point that this was going to end in disaster. This  
27:51 was kind of condemned as well, why why would you take wind out of, you know,  
27:56 out of the sale of Ukraine? Like of of that. That's a pro-Russian thing to say. Of course, it's going to be success. You  
28:01 saw the same with Kursk. I mean, I think most people knew this was going to be a horrible disaster. Why would you leave  
28:07 your defensive position, go out in the open within hostile territory, you know, and they were they were slaughtered in  
28:13 horrible horrible numbers. Yet everyone had to fall in line and pretend as if this was a good idea. And uh yeah, you  
28:22 you could say the same with, you know, the Nordstream. Everyone had to go around pretending that this was, you  
28:28 know, you Russian. And now we see this uh that everyone has to go and pretend that Ukrainians are winning. we have to  
28:34 look away from all the available facts. It's just very strange that uh that uh  
28:41 yeah that this is where we are where like objective reality doesn't have any value of its own. Everything seems to be  
28:48 only assessed by the extent to which you're applauding the right team. And if you're applauding the Ukrainians, then  
28:53 you have to pretend everything is a brilliant success and look away from the horrific defeats and horrible num  
29:00 casualties. And uh otherwise you're you're supporting the Russians. I mean it's like we're watching a football  
29:06 game. This is pretty much where we are. It's very Have you seen this before or is this because you know there's a lot  
29:13 of commonality between many wars and I know you shouldn't that uh well it's the same with the sanctions. If you say the  
29:19 sanctions aren't going to work. I noticed that from the first day as well. That was seen as being a pro-Russian  
29:24 statement because you undermine support in the in the sanctions. But are these I  
29:30 mean social constructivists who want to just uh elevate or make people support  
29:35 the wars or is there something else to this? Because it's very hard to assess why reality means so little and why  
29:42 there's this obligated adherence to narratives. Yeah.  
29:48 Well, a couple points. You know, there's a very famous book entitled Truth is the First Casualty. And the argument is that  
29:56 when a war breaks out because the propaganda machines on both sides uh  
30:01 immediately go to war the end result is that truth gets washed out of the  
30:07 picture and uh propaganda becomes of enormous importance. Uh the case I know  
30:14 best where you saw this was during the Vietnam War. Um and uh some of it uh  
30:22 revolved around casualty counts uh or what were then called body counts and uh  
30:29 there was tremendous pressure put on the American military uh to inflate body  
30:35 counts because you really needed an indicator of success. The American public was saying uh what kind of  
30:44 progress are we making here? What are the indicators that we're actually making progress? And of course,  
30:49 President Johnson and his lieutenants as well, put pressure on the American military to um indicate that we were or  
30:58 give indicators that we were making great progress against the Vietkong and the NVA. Uh so body counts became the  
31:06 principal instrument for convincing uh the upper echelons, the upper echelons  
31:12 of the uh Johnson administration and the public that we were winning the war. And  
31:18 uh you created this fantasy world where uh huge numbers of uh Vietnamese were  
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dying. Uh and therefore the story was or the story line was that we were winning  
31:32  
the war. Uh and in fact everybody who was involved in the process fully  
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understood that uh we were acting in extremely dishonest ways uh for the  
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purpose of satisfying the commanders who wanted to be able to make the case that we were winning. And if you look at a  
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lot of the battles that took place uh during the war uh we suffered enormous  
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casualties and uh in many of those cases you could argue we won but if we won we  
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barely won. Uh but nevertheless we described those battles as great  
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victories. Uh we went to great lengths to make it look like we were winning uh  
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when we weren't winning. uh and this is why we lost the war. Uh we were not  
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making progress. If you actually look at what people like Johnson and others  
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actually knew, and this even includes West Morland, what they actually knew about what was going on uh on the  
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battlefield from 65 on, remember we go in March 65 in a big way. They  
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understood that uh we were in deep trouble. And despite the fact that they  
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kept spinning these stories uh that we were doing well, that the body counts  
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proved that they understood at the same time uh that we were not doing well. Uh  
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and they were constantly searching for the magic formula which they could never find uh and never did find and therefore  
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we lost the war. But you just don't want to underestimate  
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the extent to which uh a national security establishment when it goes to  
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war uh will pursue propaganda uh in really extreme ways. Now I think  
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there are two big differences between the Vietnam situation and the present situation.  
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One is that we've just gotten much more sophisticated at it. It's really quite  
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amazing how good we are uh across the West at spinning out these stories uh  
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that are really false narratives. Uh we were not quite so good in the Vietnam  
33:52  
War, right? We've gotten much better at it. The elites have really become quite skillful uh at uh propagandizing.  
34:01  
And the second big difference is I think that during the Vietnam War and this was evident in the comments I made a few  
34:07  
minutes ago. While people were spinning positive stories and this included  
34:13  
people like Wes Morland and the military chiefs and it included of course LBJ and  
34:18  
his lieutenants. Well, they were spinning positive stories. At the same time they knew that we were in deep  
34:24  
trouble. they were aware of the fact that they were distorting the truth to  
34:29  
keep support for the war in place. I think today and this gets back to our  
34:35  
earlier conversation. I think today most western elites uh believe that uh we are  
34:43  
actually doing very well in Ukraine and that the Ukrainians themselves are performing well on the battlefield that  
34:51  
the Russians have been at least stymied uh and maybe even the tide has turned  
34:57  
and furthermore when you look at these Russian casualties you look at the disastrous state of the Russian economy  
35:05  
you look at the fact that so many people are interested in overthrowing Putin. Uh  
35:11  
really all we have to do is just keep pushing and we're going to win a victory. Uh it's going to happen. And  
35:18  
people believe that. You and I think again that this is ludicrous, but we're a minority voice here. Uh all sorts of

35:25 people uh believe this in the West. And uh all of this tells you, by the way,  
35:32 Glenn, that the only thing that's going to dispel all these foolish notions  
35:38 about what's going on is a Russian victory on the battlefield. uh if the  
35:43 Russians roll up uh the Donbass or once the Russians roll up the Donbass,  
35:50 Zaparisia and Han and then they begin to move on uh to other oblasts assuming  
35:57 they do that then it'll be impossible to maintain this narrative.  
36:02 What enables uh people in the west to to sustain this  
36:07 narrative is the slow progress of the Russian army. The fact is the Russians  
36:12 have moved very slowly uh to roll up the Ukrainians. And by the way, to go back  
36:18 to the previous subject, we were talking about casualties. One of the reasons I believe these Russian casualty numbers  
36:25 are simply wrong is that the Russians uh pursue their offensives in a very  
36:33 cautious way because they are interested in minimizing casualties. If you look  
36:39 carefully at Russian tactics on the battlefield and Russian strategy more generally, they go to enormous lengths  
36:46 to minimize the number of casualties. So this is a case where huge numbers of  
36:51 Russians are not dying in mindless frontal attacks that fail as many in the  
36:58 west would like you to believe. Uh the Russians are very cautious. They're suffering casualties for sure,  
37:05 especially because they're all those Ukrainian drones up in the sky, but the casualty numbers are not that high. And  
37:11 this, of course, is why that New York Times story is laughable.  
37:17 Yeah. Well, I think this is a key thing what you said about um Vietnam, but uh  
37:22 that is that they lie to well well essentially they lie about the war to  
37:27 buy time in order to find that magic formula you referred to. And I think that's also what happened in  
37:33 Afghanistan. If you look at the Afghanistan papers, they knew things weren't going well and they did cover it up. And again, why would you  
37:40 fight a  
37:48 losing war? And I do think that the yeah the assumption is if you can just you know keep it going something hope you  
37:55 know you cling on to hope something might uh turn up uh you know the economy could collapse the fronts could collapse  
38:02 uh or worst case gradually drain the enemy so they will end up weaker thereafter. I mean I'm assuming you know  
38:09 we had other ideal outcomes for Libya, Syria, all of these countries but you know best worst case one drains and  
38:16 destabilized enemy but uh uh but it's also interesting what you said about how to measure success because if you look  
38:22 at Ukraine uh the the best way or favorite way by the western political  
38:28 media establishment has been to measure progress based on territorial shifts. But as you and I know that doesn't make  
38:35 much sense when you're fighting a war of attrition cuz you don't spend all your forces fighting uh well storming well  
38:40 fortified lines you drain and weaken the adversary and once the front line  
38:47 collapse then you take the territories. I mean once the front lines now collapse the Russians can move faster and faster  
38:53 without the defensive lines as well. So measuring territory in a war of attrition doesn't really make sense. But  
39:00 that's what I find interesting because in the Iran war they always appear to measure deaths. But that's not but that  
39:06 doesn't really make much sense. That is Trump always point to well look at the navy their air force everything is gone.  
But but measuring death and destruction as success doesn't really make much sense if the Iranians can hold on to the

39:13 straight of Hormuz uh with very cheap simple uh drones and also they're

39:20 willing to absorb all this pain because you know doesn't matter how many of them you kill they're still going to be willing to fight and they're still going

39:26 to be willing to produce the capabilities required to keep that straight closed. So the as you say the

39:33 KPIs or the the indicators of success is very strange or perhaps deliberately so

39:40 uh strange uh how they measure success. Um I can I just jump in here Glenn?

39:47 You know we were just talking about casualty numbers in the Ukraine war and

39:53 what the New York Times has been reporting. This is the same as body counts, right? This is a body count

39:59 argument. This is just like Vietnam. Very important to understand that

40:05 you pointed out quite correctly, of course, that in the west we often talk

40:10 about the failure of the Russians to capture territory. And you say that that's not a good indicator when you're

40:17 in a war of attrition. And that of course is true. And in a war of attrition, what matters is the casualty

40:23 exchange ratio. And the casualty exchange ratio is effectively the same as body counts. So what you see going on

40:31 here with this New York Times piece is very similar to what you saw with body

40:36 counts in Vietnam and the body count process in Vietnam was fundamentally

40:45 dishonest. Very important to understand that. And the body count process in

40:52 Ukraine, as we discussed about the New York Times article, is fundamentally

40:58 dishonest. And it's exactly what you would expect. I want to make another

41:03 point, very important to understand that the Vietnam War and the Ukraine war were

41:10 ground wars or are ground wars or is a ground war in the Ukraine case and was a

41:15 ground war in the Vietnam case. I have to get my tenses right here. Uh there

41:21 were ground wars where armies were crashing into each other and huge numbers of people were dying. So body

41:27 counts or casualty exchange ratios mattered. In the Gulf, in the Iran war today,

41:34 there's no ground war. Remember that uh the initial

41:41 part of the war uh from February 28th to April 8th was fought in the air. That

41:49 was the air war from February 28th to April 8th. Then the air war ended. The

41:56 bombing effectively ended except for two minor blips later on we could talk about. But the year war basically ended

42:03 and we segued to a blockade. It was April 13th when we moved to a blockade

42:10 and the blockade ended when we signed the memorandum of understanding. That was June 17th. So we went from a bombing

42:18 campaign to a blockade and we never launched a ground offensive.

42:24 And uh so there's no body count argument at play in uh the Iran war. It's a very

42:33 different kind of conflict. And to be more

42:40 specific about the Iran case, is everybody said, if you really wanted to

42:46 achieve the goals that the Iran that the Israelis and the Americans set out for

42:52 themselves on February 28th, you would need boots on the ground. There's the

42:58 ground option. and we were unwilling on February 28th and at any point since

43:03 then to put boots on the ground at least in any meaningful way. So, we've never

43:09 gone near that ground option because when you go to the ground option, that's when you really suffer serious

43:16 casualties. And when you suffer really serious casualties, it becomes much more difficult to

43:24 justify the war. And that's why the body counts, the casualty exchange ratios

43:29 attract so much attention. So, no, I I agree. But also yeah with

43:35 with Iran would have thought the US would have greater success though that is it did stay away from the ground war

43:41 because as a naval power such as the United States it well uh history

43:46 suggests it should stay out of ground wars be it Vietnam Iraq that this is not playing to America's strength but in

43:53 Iran you had naval power air power so it it

43:58 should I guess have assumed the greater success on the American side on the other hand you can't really win a war

44:05 with air power alone either. Um, but how how do you measure success in the war

44:12 against Iran on behalf of the Americans? That is uh how how would you measure

44:17 progress? Because uh it's a very unique kind of war. Uh is it the destruction of

44:24 ballistic missiles, offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities? Is it removing proxies or allies be

44:31 Lebanon, Iraq or Yemen? How would you how how do how would we know if the

44:36 United States would be winning the war against uh Iran?

44:42 A couple of points. One is we're not going to win the war. We're going to lose the war. But in the process of

44:49 losing the war, we have two goals that we need to achieve.

44:55 And uh if we come out of this in reasonably good shape, uh we will have

45:01 achieved those two goals. But it's just very important to understand that Iran has won this war. Iran is going to

45:08 emerge from this war much more powerful relative to its neighbors than it was on

45:13 February 27th. Uh and uh uh America's

45:20 position in the Gulf is going to be greatly weakened as a result of this

45:25 war. But I want to get to your specific question because it is terribly important. We have two goals here.

45:33 Putting aside the question whether we win or lose, we have two goals. Number one is to open the straight because we

45:40 got to get oil flowing and that can include that will include Iranian oil

45:47 which we're allowing to come out of the strait. Uh and we're allowing the Iranians uh to get uh paid in dollars

45:58 for that oil, right? We're giving them a good deal because we want to flood the market with oil so that the economy, the

46:04 international economy doesn't go off a cliff. So, goal number one was to open the straight, get the oil flowing.

46:11 Goal number two is to get a nuclear deal. Uh we have to get a nuclear deal.

46:18 It's obviously going to be some variant of the JCPOA, but there has to be some sort of deal

46:25 that limits what Iran could do developing nuclear weapons moving

46:30 forward. You mentioned missiles. There's going to be no agreement on missiles. Uh some people might say, well, what about

46:36 supporting Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthies? There's going to be no agreement there, right? Uh the regime

46:45 change, that was another one of our goals. There's not going to be regime change. Uh not as a result immediate

46:52 result of this war. Maybe in two or three or four years, who knows? But not now. The key issue is the nuclear issue.

47:00 Now, it's very important to understand how the memorandum of understanding was structured. It was structured so that

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the shooting between or the bombing between Iran and the United States would  
47:17  
be shut down uh once the memorandum was signed uh and  
47:22  
number two the strait would be opened and oil would flow out into world markets. Now, with regard to the  
47:28  
bombing, the bombing campaign stopped on April 8th. There was really nothing to  
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stop. The bombing campaign ended and we went to uh we went to a blockade and we  
47:42  
can't go back to a bombing campaign for a whole slew of different reasons, right? So, that really didn't matter  
47:49  
that much except maybe in Lebanon, but let's leave Lebanon aside.  
47:54  
The key issue to start with that we cared about was opening the straight.  
48:00  
And the straight is now opened for all intents and purposes. Not fully open,  
48:06  
but it appears that it may be fully opened. Uh and if it isn't, we're in real trouble. But that was the least  
48:13  
difficult goal to achieve because the Iranians have a vested interest in selling their oil. Okay. The big number  
48:22  
two goal that's sitting out there is the nuclear issue and that is yet to be  
48:29  
resolved. What you want to understand here is we now have to deal with the  
48:36  
nuclear issue side by side with four big economic  
48:44  
issues that would all be advantage Iran. One is  
48:50  
reparations. Two is the frozen apps assets.  
48:55  
Three is lifting the sanctions. And four is the question of the toll booth in the  
49:02  
straight. In other words, these issues have not been resolved. Just think about it. That \$300 billion fund for  
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reparations not settled yet. Uh lifting all the sanctions not settled yet.  
49:18  
uh releasing all the frozen assets. I'd guess they're probably over a hundred  
49:23  
billion dollars in frozen assets uh unfreezing all of them and then the toll  
49:29  
booth issue. Okay, they have to be resolved those issues and the nuclear issue has to be resolved. Right? So, we  
49:38  
have solved the problem of opening the straits for the most part in the beginning and now we have all  
49:45  
those other big issues staring us in the face. And I would just say to you, if we  
49:52  
don't get a deal, we meaning the West, and here we're talking mainly about the United States, we don't get a deal on  
49:58  
the nuclear issue, we're going to be in real trouble because, as you well know, the Iranians have the capability  
50:05  
to quite easily build a bomb. And if we don't have something like a revised version of the JCPOA, what's going to  
50:13  
stop them from building a bomb? So, there's going to be very powerful incentives on us  
50:20  
to get that deal, which means that we're likely to have to make major concessions  
50:26  
to the Iranians on those four big economic issues that the Iranians care  
50:33  
about. So, there's a lot of negotiation to be done and it just seems to me if  
50:38  
we're going to be successful, we've got to keep the straight open, number one,  
50:44  
and number two, we got to get a nuclear deal. Well, if those were the only two  
50:49  
objectives, that is a nuclear deal and get the oil flowing, it would be achievable because well, the Iranians  
50:56  
weren't pursuing nuclear weapons before this war and the oil was flowing before the war as well. But as you said,  
51:02  
there's a new objectives now. Uh, well, the MOU makes it very clear there's no  
51:07  
going back to the old status quo. So the Iranians um you know I think they're

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worried as well because on one hand I don't it's hard to imagine the US implementing all the things it signed

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under with the MOU that is ending all sanctions getting Congress on

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board giving \$300 billion in reparations uh accepting the toll booth or fee or

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whatever one wants to refer to it. It's it's very hard to see this being acceptable. At the same time, there's no

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good military option unless, you know, Israel might be able to instigate a

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civil war in Lebanon or the US could pressure Iraqi government to shut down some Israel, some Iranian militant

51:51

groups. I mean, one one could go after allies, but but it doesn't look like that's a viable

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strategy for for military success. So, I'm just uh h Did you think what do you

52:04

think the strategy is here? Will will they take a horrible peace deal or will

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they take a non-existent military option or how are you assessing what's likely

52:16

based on American strategy here or what how you see the strategy at least?

52:22

Well, this is a great question. Let's just talk this through.

52:27

First of all, there's no military option as you and I know. And one reason

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there's no military option is that if you go back to bombing, the straight will be closed again.

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We can't do anything that allows the straight to be closed again. That we

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just got it open and we want to keep it open. And you know, for all these people

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are talking about, let's go back and finish the job. What are they talking about? We had a 40-day bombing campaign.

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It didn't work. That's why we ended it on April 8th. And furthermore, we were running out of munitions. And

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furthermore, the Iranians have a second strike capability. And furthermore, they

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can really crash the economic uh the world economy. So, what are people

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talking about? We don't have a military option. Uh we got the straight open.

53:24

And now the question is, are we going to deal with the nuclear

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issue? You're saying, Glenn, I think quite correctly, I'm not disagreeing with you,

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that it's hard to imagine the Americans making those concessions that I

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described on what I called the four big economic issues. Okay. Uh again, uh the

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whole question of the toll booth, uh the fro releasing all those frozen assets,

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almost complete sanctions relief and the \$300 billion reparations fund. Can you

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really see the United States conceding on all those issues? I mean, the end

54:07

result would be that uh Iran would be in excellent shape moving forward. Uh this

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is a country with 93 million people. you get its economy back on its feet. Uh

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it's in a position where it dominates the Persian Gulf. Uh it controls the straight hormuz. Uh

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Iran would be really quite powerful. Is America going to let this happen? That's

54:32

the question you're asking. Okay. The counter to that, Glenn, is what about

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the nuclear issue? The Iranians are going to play hard ball with us. We know that. They're gonna

54:45

say, "If you don't dance to Arc Tune on the economic issues, no nuclear deal."

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What are we gonna do then? No nuclear deal. I don't know about that. We got to

54:59

get a nuclear deal. I think uh but if we don't get a nuclear deal,  
55:05  
we're going to be in real trouble because there is a really good chance that they'll get nuclear weapons  
55:13  
uh or they'll move in that direction and this will cause the Israelis to think  
55:18  
about using their nuclear weapons, Israeli nuclear weapons against Iran. So  
55:25  
the potential for disaster here. So, we have a very powerful incentive to get a nuclear deal. Trump has a very powerful  
55:32  
incentive to put this behind us. Just to come at this from a slightly different angle,  
55:39  
you understand that the Iranians wanted to deal with the nuclear issue upfront.  
55:45  
Remember, I described the memorandum of understanding as dealing first with opening the straight, ending the  
55:52  
shooting. That's one. and then later dealing with the nuclear issue and those big economic issues. Okay, the Iranians  
56:01  
were smart. They put the Iran, excuse me, they put the nuclear issue at the rear end of the negotiations because  
56:08  
they knew it would give them huge leverage down the road. If they negotiated the nuclear deal and  
56:15  
the straight deal now, right, and then later they move to the economic issues,  
56:20  
they'd have no leverage. The only thing that gives them leverage, they no longer have leverage because they control the  
56:27  
strait, because they've opened the straight. Their leverage now rests with the nuclear issue. They were smart to  
56:34  
keep the nuclear issue until the end. So they have a lot of leverage over us and  
56:40  
we have a vested interest in caving to them fulfilling  
56:45  
the various uh agreements that make up the uh  
56:52  
memorandum of understanding. Uh but maybe that won't happen. But the  
56:57  
end result is we won't get a nuclear deal. Well uh let me just ask one final  
57:04  
question though. If we take a few steps backwards to get um see a larger picture, how would you define the  
57:12  
American grand strategy now at this point in history? That is you know during the cold war the grand strategy  
57:18  
with you know one rival, one other center of power with one competing  
57:24  
ideology. Uh it was uh you know the grand strategy of containment and all  
57:29  
the other components. it um it set a clear goal which kind of brought more or  
57:34  
less the whole political class together. All other strategies were kind of had to be subordinated to this wider grand  
57:40  
strategy. What is it today? How is the United States dealing with the the massive  
57:47  
changes in the world and its own role in this world? That's a large question for Yeah. about um  
57:54  
well I think when uh me and my friends or my friends and I  
58:02  
thought about grand strategy over the decades we always used to argue that  
58:08  
obviously the western hemisphere is the most important area of the world for the United States but given that the United  
58:13  
States is a regional hegeimon there's no serious threats in the western hemisphere  
58:19  
um the question is what are the areas outside of the United States that matter the most from a strategic point of view.  
58:28  
Where are our vital interests at play around the world? And I think most  
58:33  
people in my circle agreed that the three areas that mattered the most were  
58:40  
Europe, East Asia, because there were great powers in Europe and East Asia. Uh  
58:46  
and the Persian Gulf because oil was there. Those were the three key areas of the world outside of the western  
58:53  
hemisphere. Uh and during the cold war, we focused

58:58  
mainly on Europe because the Soviet threat was centered in Europe. But the Soviet Union uh was and Russia is  
59:06  
physically located in East Asia as we both know. So we cared about containing  
59:11  
the Soviets not just in Europe but in East Asia as well. Uh and the Persian Gulf was the area  
59:18  
where we had to do the least amount of work. Uh the British did the heavy lifting in the Gulf up until 1968.  
59:27  
And then after 1968 up to 1979, we depended on the Iranians. This is  
59:34  
under the sha, the Saudis, and we didn't have any great threat. After 1979 when  
59:40  
the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and um uh there was the revolution in  
59:47  
Iran and Iran was no longer an ally. We built the rapid deployment force which  
59:53  
was an over the horizon capability. In other words, we were not physically located with military forces or we  
1:00:00  
didn't have many military forces physically located in the Gulf. We had this rapid deployment force which again  
1:00:06  
was over the horizon. So you see that during the cold war we cared about Europe, we cared about East Asia and we  
1:00:14  
cared about the Gulf. Uh then comes the  
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multipolar world that we're now in. And China is the principal threat to the  
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United States and therefore we pivoted to Asia. And there was a lot of talk about pivoting away from Europe and  
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minimizing our commitment to the Gulf because we didn't see any great problem in the Gulf. Uh we thought we had things  
1:00:41  
under control. Uh and with regard to the Western Hemisphere,  
1:00:47  
um you know, things were pretty good in the Western Hemisphere. Uh no serious  
1:00:54  
threats to the United States. Along comes the Trump administration.  
1:01:00  
uh back into the White House January 2025. Uh what you see is that President Trump  
1:01:08  
decides to make the Western Hemisphere a high priority and we're deeply involved  
1:01:15  
in social engineering and military engagement in the Western Hemisphere.  
1:01:20  
Uh, if you look at what's happening in Venezuela, if you look at what's happening with regard to Cuba, if you  
1:01:26  
look at President Trump's rhetoric about the Panama Canal, about Greenland and making Canada and making Canada the 51st  
1:01:34  
state, the United States is paying a lot of attention to the Western Hemisphere,  
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which kind of befuddles me because I don't think we face any serious threats at this point in time in the Western  
1:01:44  
Hemisphere. uh but nevertheless we are deeply involved in doing social engineering and  
1:01:50  
even maybe acquiring territory in the western hemisphere. You want to remember  
1:01:57  
that President Trump said at the time uh uh when we captured uh President Maduro  
1:02:04  
of Venezuela that the United States now or he he now runs Venezuela and that he  
1:02:13  
basically viewed Venezuelan oil as American oil. It's really quite remarkable. So you can see that we're on  
1:02:20  
the march in certain ways in uh the western hemisphere. With regard to the  
1:02:26  
Gulf, uh we're now involved in a major conflict with Iran. Uh it's really quite  
1:02:34  
amazing. One can make the argument, Glenn, that we will eventually leave the Gulf. Uh that we can no longer maintain  
1:02:42  
military bases there. Our alliance structure is in tatters. That may happen. But for the time being, if you  
1:02:49  
look at American grand strategy, we are up to our eyeballs and alligators in the  
1:02:54  
Persian Gulf. Uh, and as I said, we're deeply involved in the Western  
1:03:00

Hemisphere. With regard to Ukraine and Europe, as we talked about earlier in  
1:03:05  
the show, it appears that President Trump is more or less re-engaging in  
1:03:11  
Ukraine, uh, getting more deeply involved. And one could argue, Glenn, as  
1:03:17  
the tide turns against Ukraine, which you and I know is happening as we speak,  
1:03:23  
uh, that the Russians will feel, excuse me, the Americans will feel compelled to move in and do everything possible to  
1:03:29  
rescue Ukraine so as not to suffer a humiliating defeat. And then there's  
1:03:35  
East Asia. That is what the Pentagon calls the pacing threat. So, we're not leaving East Asia. Uh and if you look at  
1:03:43  
what the Chinese are likely to do over time and what the Americans are likely  
1:03:48  
to do over time, that's a dangerous area of the world. Uh I wouldn't be surprised  
1:03:53  
if 10 years from now or even five years from now when you and I are talking about all the problems in the world uh  
1:04:00  
that China is not at the top of the list. Uh so all of this is to say that  
1:04:06  
the United States under President Trump has a remarkably ambitious grand  
1:04:11  
strategy. Think about what I said about the Western Hemisphere. Think about where we are in the Gulf. Think about  
1:04:16  
where we are visav Ukraine. And think about the pacing threat, China. Uh we  
1:04:23  
don't seem to believe in the word prioritizing. uh the United States still labors under  
1:04:29  
the illusion that it can be everywhere and do everything all the time. Uh and  
1:04:36  
uh I think that's where American grand strategy is at the moment. Uh I think we  
1:04:42  
could have a long conversation and we should do this the next time we talk or maybe do it the next time we talk about  
1:04:49  
where American grand strategy is headed. you know, once uh these various  
1:04:56  
conflicts are behind us or they sort themselves out and here we're talking about Ukraine  
1:05:02  
uh and uh and Iran and also to some extent places like Cuba uh and Greenland  
1:05:09  
uh then we can maybe get a clearer picture of American grand strategy. But I do think Glenn we the United States  
1:05:17  
are going to have to learn to prioritize. I think this idea that, you know, we can maintain this militarized  
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state that's involved uh in really deep-seated ways in all four of these  
1:05:30  
regions uh is not uh is not workable over the long term.  
1:05:36  
No, that's what I thought was the main challenge to the United States at this time in history though that is  
1:05:42  
transition from uniolarity where essentially has final say in every corner of the world to multiparity. the  
1:05:49  
grand strategy would have to include priorities that is uh you can't be everywhere then what what comes first  
1:05:55  
and this you know I don't want to belittle the politicians I think this is a difficult thing to adjust to once you  
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had a political culture over decades of being everywhere at the same time and embracing an ideology which makes it  
1:06:08  
almost treasonous and you know uncaring not to be everywhere because all our wars is of course sold as being about  
1:06:14  
you know helping the and uh yeah helping the disenfranchised and advancing  
1:06:20  
liberal democracy. So it's very difficult to make this shift but I thought that the that was the lesson  
1:06:25  
from the Iran war though that is if you can't have I mean when all the weapons had been spent in Ukraine and then  
1:06:32  
suddenly you know how are we going to fight the Iranians then have to take the weapons from the Europeans from the Ukrainians from  
the East Asians and send  
1:06:39  
it all not just to the Middle East but Israel because even the Gulf States were robbed of some of their air defenses. So  
1:06:45

I thought this was the main lesson. If you prioritize everything, you're not prioritizing anything at all. And uh but  
1:06:51 again, it could be, you know, huge shifts in the international distribution of power. It's hugely destabilizing  
1:06:57 because politicians, you know, they they do need time to adjust to new realities, I think. U anyways, uh do you have any  
1:07:04 final thoughts before we uh end the video? Yeah, let me make two quick points. One  
1:07:10 is the debt problem. Uh I I sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry  
1:07:15 sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry to interrupt but I always look at the depthc clock.org And  
uh I'm not even American. It's still  
1:07:21 depressing to me. It's a horrific number. So, sorry. Go on.  
1:07:27 No, no. You're you're right. It's a you sort of  
1:07:32 think the chickens are going to come home to roost on that problem at some point in time. Satan thing is Glenn if  
1:07:40 you look at u you look at the Ukraine war uh and you think about fighting a  
1:07:46 war against China or you think about fighting a war anywhere what's very clear is that you need a  
1:07:53 large industrial base and you need the capability to produce huge numbers of  
1:07:59 weapons uh I mean again just to go back to the Iran war we had to quit after 40 days  
1:08:06 because we were basic basically running out of weaponry. It's truly amazing the extent to which we have run down our  
1:08:12 inventories of like Tomahawk missiles, Patriot missiles, THAAD missiles, uh  
1:08:18 airtro ground smart bombs and so forth and so on. Really quite amazing. And it's also quite amazing how long it's  
1:08:25 going to take us to rebuild uh those uh inventories which have been  
1:08:31 uh whittled down. Um, and what this tells you is that we are going to have  
1:08:40 to prioritize if you're going to plan for a war in Asia, right? And you're  
1:08:46 thinking about how you deal with the Chinese in a war over Taiwan or the South China Sea, a war that's going to  
1:08:53 go on for many months. Now, let's hope this never happens. I'm not saying this  
1:08:58 is likely or it's going to happen, but the Americans are going to have to prepare for a long war. Uh this is what  
1:09:05 the Ukraine war has taught us, and we don't have the manufacturing base. When  
1:09:11 you look at how long it's going to take us to replenish our depleted stocks from  
1:09:16 the Iran war, it's really genuinely frightening from a security point of view. Really, it's quite amazing. So I  
1:09:24 think when you look at the debt problem and you look at the weakness of the  
1:09:29 American manufacturing base and the need to build uh a largecale inventory of  
1:09:36 weapons and to have the ability to produce weapons once the conflict starts. We have a lot of work cut out  
1:09:43 for us. Uh and that's going to involve prioritizing. So I think that the events  
1:09:49 that are now taking place, let me put it slightly differently, the events that have taken place since the Ukraine war  
1:09:57 started in 2022 up to the present day. Uh this five-year period uh is a period  
1:10:05 in which we have or maybe it's a four-year period is a period in which we  
1:10:11 have learned a lot. uh and what we have learned uh should leave us deeply  
1:10:19 worried about our future. And when I say our I'm talking here about the US.  
1:10:25 Well, uh until next time, uh I hope to be able to discuss some more grand strategy with you because yeah, the US  
1:10:32 has a yeah, fascinating history there. So, uh thank you so much uh for your time and um yeah, have a good one.  
1:10:38

My pleasure, Glenn. Best to you.

All

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